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Atmosphere for Defense Decisions
Secretary of Eefense Robert S. McNamara has aggressively pur-
sued the role of the Secretary of Defense as he sees it. His definition of
this role is not merely that of an administrator or "judge of the decisions
being made in the Department of Defense. In his own words, he denies the
passive role.
My own strong belief is a manager should be an aggressive




There is a chain of assumptions necessary to an understanding of
the requirements for this kind of aggressive, active leadership. First, it
requires an unprecedented centralization of decision making. This, in
turn, means that a substantial amount of information, in the form and
timeliness necessary to facilitate decisions, be provided to the Secretary.
The budget provided substantial information concerning the activi-
ties of the military services, but it was not in such form that major
decisions regarding the possible trade-offs between the service programs
could be observed. Stated another way:
David Seligman, McNamara 's Management Revolution, ' Fortune
,
July, 1965, p. 119.
;
The relationship between resources shown in the budget and
military missions was not explicit . . . the long-term implications
of budget decisions were not easily or clearly seen. *
There existed a dichotomy between the long-range planning of the military
services, which dealt in outputs, and the short-range budget, dealing in
inputs.
The first step toward providing Mr. McNamara the decision -making
ability he desired was to span the gap between the long-range military plans
prepared by the military planning organizations and the budgets prepared by
the individual military Comptroller organizations which were essentially
uncoordinated. Mr. McNamara and Mr. Hitch attempted to span this gap
2
by establishing the programming process to precede budget formulation.
This was a start in the systematic structuring of problems in terms
of objectives, needs, interrelationships, and proportion of major Defense
Department programs. Just having this basic structure was a giant step in
the design for an atmosphere of decision making. Something more was
required, however, as one of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense
wrote:
The bewildering array of entirely feasible alternative forces
which our scientists can offer today has enormously complicated our
problems of choice. There is hardly a military task which cannot be
accomplished in a multitude of ways. . . .
We cannot hedge against this array of possibilities by simply
buying them all. To attempt to do so would only lead to squandering
Bert Mogin, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
Speech before the Navy Financial Management Students, The George




of resources on partially completed programs. Choices have to be
made, and the aim of systems analysis is to help in making these
choices correctly. *
Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this paper is to establish that there is a design for
knowledgeable decision making in the Department of Defense and to describe
and evaluate the role of systems analysis in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense as it relates to that design. Some of the questions this paper hopes
to answer are these:
1. What is the modern design for defense decision making?
2. How does systems analysis fit into the design?
3. What is systems analysis and how can the process as applied
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense be defined and described?
4. What are the recognized benefits and limitations of the sys-
tems analysis approach?
5. How does the application of the systems analysis approach in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense affect the Navy?
This paper is organized, first, to describe in broad terms the
framework within which the Secretary of Defense makes decisions concerning
force level. Within this framework, the importance and reliance placed on
systems analysis will be discussed. The nature of the dialogue between the
Russell Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
General Purpose Programs (Systems Analysis), "Systems Analysis and Cost
Effectiveness, " Defense Industry Bulletin , II, No. 9 (September, 1966), 1.

services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding systems analy-
sis actions and determinations will be described using both formal and
informal lines of communication. Systems analysis will be discussed as an
applied economic approach to decision making with its recognized limitations.
Finally, the application of systems analysis to Navy programs will be dis-
cussed with its resultant implications.
Significance of the Study
The primary significance of this paper is to gain and demonstrate
an understanding of the approach and application of systems analysis. Since
the Secretary of Defense decisions regarding force structures and levels
within the services have an impact on all defense activity, it has become
vital for all Naval Officers as well as other Department of Defense employees
to have an appreciation for the decision process. The intention of this paper
is to shed some small amount of light on at least part of the decision proce-
dure which has heretofore been viewed with awe, if not as a complete mys-
tery, by many members of the Department.
Some recent actions taken in the Federal Government Administration
reveal the attitude of the President and Congress concerning their acceptance
of the dec is ion -making processes of the Department of Defense. The Presi-
dent in October, 1965, for example, directed the introduction of an inte-
grated Planning -Programming -Budgeting System in all agencies of the
Personal interview with Captain Charles Woods, USN, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, Code OP 96 (Systems Analysis), December 8 and 9
1966.

5Executive Branch. In describing the need for such a system, the Bureau of
the Budget explained that with present practices:
Objectives of agency programs and activities have too often not
been specified with enough clarity and concreteness; accomplishments
have not always been specified concretely; alternatives have been
insufficiently presented for consideration by top management; in a
number of cases the future year costs of present decisions have not
been laid out systematically enough; and formalized planning and sys-
tems analysis have had too little effect on budget decisions.
Also, in October, 1965, Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin intro
duced a bill entitled the "Scientific Manpower Utilization Act, " which would
authorize the spending of $125 million in helping states and universities to
apply systems analysis to urgent problems. In October, 1966, Senator
Nelson, for the Congressional Record , welcomed the support his bill was
receiving and took the opportunity to further emphasize its importance:
The systems approach to problem solving has attracted consider-
able attention in the past several years. Born out of the defense and
space efforts, this approach is now finding application in the civilian
sector. The rising problems of transportation, environmental pollu-
tion, crime and regional and urban development lend themselves to
the ever -improving tools and techniques of systems analysis, auto-
matic data processing, systems engineering and operations research.
. . .
The unrealized potential of the systems approach at state and
local levels convinces me that congressional action is needed soon. ^
Within the Department of Defense, McNamara's decision methods
have been spreading rapidly, from the Secretary's Office to the services.
As Seligman points out in "McNamara's Management Revolution, " the
Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, Bulletin
No. 66-3





89th Cong. , 2d Sess. , October 12,
1966, pp. 27300-27301.

services "have been actively developing systems -analysis capabilities of
their own, so that, to caricature the situation only slightly, they will be
able to slug it out with Enthoven's boys on more even terms. The Navy,
recognizing the need for a central repository of systems -analysis talent,
has within the last eight months established a Systems Analysis Division in
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. It was created to provide the
Chief of Naval Operations with "the capability to evaluate the relative effec-
tiveness of alternatives in programs and program proposals, and thereby to
2
assist in the decision -making process. " The main problem faced by this
office thus far is to "sell" the approach to the force sponsors within the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. It must be made clear to the force
sponsors that their positions during the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of
the Secretary of Defense reviews will be strengthened rather than weakened
if their programs are presented with alternative courses of action showing
3
sacrifice risk.
It is therefore obvious that an evaluation of the systems analysis
approach within the design for decision making of the Department of Defense




Charter for Systems Analysis Group, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations.
3
Personal interview with LCdr. Shelby Clark, SC, USN, OP-96




While there is a considerable amount of literature devoted to
decision making in the Department of Defense, most of the books pre-date
the "management revolution ' of the 1960's and, in fact, appear to be blue-
prints for the present atmosphere. To absorb impressions and reactions
to present processes ol decision making, it became necessary to turn to
more current periodicals and even these were theoretical in nature or at
least less than objective in their interpretations. The remaining sources
of data were found in studies such as those conducted by the RAND Corpora-
tion; and most current information was gathered through extensive study of
instructions and notices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the Navy; lectures by Department of Defense officials currently working in
the area; and, finally, numerous personal interviews with both military and
civilian personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations.

CHAPTER II
MODERN DESIGN FOR DEFENSE DECISION MAKING
Evolution
When President Kennedy first asked Mr. McNamara to accept
appointment as the Secretary of Defense, three basic questions came to
McNamara' s mind:
What was the climate in the Pentagon? What kind of a job was
being Secretary of Defense? Could I--or for that matter could any-
one --truly manage the Department of Defense?
The Department of Defense has, in fact, progressed through various
phases of strengthening the authority of the Secretary, but this progression
has done little to provide him with the tools for making decision. The Nationa
Security Act of 1947 established the Secretary of Defense and authorized him
to establish general policies and programs and to exercise "general
2
direction, authority, and control of the military services.
Prior to World War II, there was much opposition to unification in
any manner of the services. During that war, however, the combined land/
sea/air operations played such a vital role that the need for unification of
Robert S. McNamara, "Managing the Department of Defense, "
Civil Service Journal, IV, No. 4 (April-June, 1964), 1.
2
National Security Act of 1947, P. L. 253, 80th Cong. , 1st Sess. ,
July 26, 1947 (61 Stat. 495).
3

planning and operations was recognized. President Truman, in 1945, made
a strong recommendation to Congress for the establishment of a single
Department of National Defense. Mr. Charles J. Hitch (who was later to
become Mr. McNamara's first Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller)
quoted from Mr. Truman's own words to describe and analyze the essence
of the President's proposal for unification:
In order to achieve this purpose, he felt that "we should have
integrated strategic plans and a unified military program and
budget. " In this connection he stressed a principle that is only now
being generally accepted in the Defense Department, namely, and I
use his words, that "strategy, program, and budget are all aspects
of the same basic decisions. "*
The National Security Act of 1947 fell far short of these purposes.
In 1949, through recommendations by the first Secretary of Defense,
James V. Forrestal, the Hoover Commission, and others, amendments
were made to that Act in order to bring the Secretary of Defense the powers
to exercise his authority over the armed services and thus established the
paramount position of the Secretary of Defense as the principal assistant
to the President on defense matters. At the same time, the Army, Navy,
and Air Force relinquished their status as Executive Departments. The
Office of the Secretary of Defense was to include a Deputy and three
Assistant Secretaries. A Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was
created. Additionally, Title IV was added to the Act to provide for the office
Charles J. Hitch, "Decision Making in the Department of Defense, "
from the H. Rowan Gaither Lectures in Systems Sciences, at the University
of California, April 5-9, 1965, p. 18.
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of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, and the uniformity of
budget and fiscal procedures throughout the Department.
In 1953, the Office of the Secretary of Defense was further
strengthened to provide that no military function was to be carried out inde-
pendently of the Secretary of Defense and the office was expanded from three
2
to nine Assistant Secretaries. Again in 1958, a reorganization took the
military departments, which had been acting as executive agents in the
operational control of the unified commands, out of the chain of command
so that the line now runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense,
3
through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the unified commands.
A 5 President Eisenhower pointed out in his special message to
Congress on the 1953 reorganization:
Complete unity in our strategic planning and basic operational
direction /_is a vital necessity^/. It is therefore mandatory that the
initiative for this planning and direction rest not with the separate
services, but directly with the Secretary of Defense and his opera-
tional advisers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by such staff
organization as they deem necessary.




August 10, 1949 (63 Stat. 578).
2
Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 (67 Stat. 638).
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, P. L. 85-599,
85th Cong. , 2d Sess. , August 6, 1958 (72 Stat. 514).
4





It becomes clear from the foregoing brief historical analysis that,
since World War II, the design for centralized decision making in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense has been the concern and direction of Presidents
and the Congress. All of these actions were not met with great enthusiasm
by the military service departments since it became apparent even then that
they were being stripped little by little of their power to operate in a unilat-
eral manner.
Responsibility versus Ability
The Office of the Secretary of Defense had indeed been given the
responsibility and authority to direct the affairs of the military departments.
Mr. McNamara, in an attempt to answer some of his questions about the
role of the Secretary of Defense, talked to his predecessor, Thomas S.
Gates, Jr. , who showed him a committee report that had been published in
1953 concerning the powers of that office. Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, who
headed the committee, included the following in his report to Congress:
The Secretary of Defense has by statute full and complete
authority over the Department of Defense, all its agencies, sub-
divisions and personnel subject only to the President.
. . . There
are no separately administered preserves in the Department of
Defense.
. . . The Secretaries of the Military Departments, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, all officers and other personnel are under the
Secretary of Defense
. . .
His power extends to all affairs and
activities of the Department of Defense.
The responsibility for control was therefore very clear, but the
sheer magnitude of the task lends credence to Mr. McNamara' s question as




to whether anyone could really manage the Defense Department.
There is a force today of nearly three million military personnel
on active duty, supported by over one million civilians and backed up by
one million military reserve personnel. With a budget of over $60 billion,
and with a vast scope of activity touching virtually every segment of the
American economy, the decisions made in the areas of procurement and
force structures are vitally important. How, one might ask, could any man,
or group of men, ever manage such a vast aggregation of men, equipment,
installations, and activities all over the world? To be fully effective, how-
ever, the defense effort must be managed on a uniform basis in planning as
well as in the conduct of combat operations. President Eisenhower, in his
message to the Congress on the reorganization of 1958, stressed this point
of unity in plans:
No military task is of greater importance than the development
of strategic plans which relate our revolutionary new weapons and
force deployments to national security objectives. Genuine unity is
indispensable at this starting point. No amount of subsequent coor-
dination can eliminate duplication or doctrinal conflicts which are
intruded into the first shaping of military programs. *
When Mr. McNamara arrived at the Pentagon in 1961, he found that
military planning and budgeting were being performed independently. Plan-
ning, the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the military-
departments, was accomplished in terms of military forces and weapon sys-
tems and was projected over periods of from five to ten years. Budgeting,
p. 22.
Hitch, "Decision Making in the Department of Defense, " op. cit. ,
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however, was done in terms of functional categories such as military
personnel, " and line items such as travel" and pensions, annuities, and
insurance claims, which were breakdowns of the functional categories.
This gap between military planning and budgeting has been held
responsible for the so-called interservice "rivalry, " the alleged strife
which--it was charged by observers of the Pentagon scene during the 1950's--
was costing the American taxpayers millions of dollars each year. Budget
preparation during that period was characterized by special pleading as each
military service proceeded independently of the others in pushing its indi-
vidual interests. Because of the lack of coordination between military plan-
ning and defense budgeting, each service was disposed to submit each and
every worthwhile project as a budget request in the hope of increasing its
share of the budget without regard to the plans being made in the other
services. General Maxwell D. Taylor expressed this view in these words:
The three services develop their forces more or less in isolation
from each other, so that a force category such as strategic retalia-
tory force, which consists of contributions of both the Navy and the
Air Force, is never viewed in the aggregate. ... In other words,
we look at our forces horizontally when we think of combat functions,
but we view them vertically in developing the defense budget. 2
Although previous legislation had, at the time of its passage, been
3
called a major overhaul of the entire DOD budget and fiscal system, ' it
"What Tying Dollars to Military Decisions Means to Defense
Management, Armed Forces Management
,
DC, November 1962, p. 87.
2
Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper
and Bros.
, 1959), p. 123.
3
"What Tying Dollars to Military Decisions Means






did not bridge the gap between planning and the budget. It still remained for
Mr. McNamara to accomplish the bridging operation. The shortcomings of
this split between planning and budgeting had not gone unnoticed in Congress.
In two letters to the Secretary of Defense in 1959. Representative George
Mahon, then Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee,
stressed the importance of looking at the Defense programs and budget in
terms of military missions by grouping programs and their cost by mission.
He also called for more useful information and for a practical means of
relating costs to missions. "
Mr. McNamara sought an alternative to the system so that he could
allocate funds to the services on the basis of the overall needs of national
security and thus provide the country with a balanced military posture. He
called for a study of defense budgeting which would lead to this new approach
--whose main goal would be the forging of a link between military planning
and defense budgeting.
The blueprint for the new approach was already in existence in a
book entitled The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, by Charles J.
Hitch and Roland N. McKean. Mr. Hitch, who was Mr. McNamara's
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), offers considerable insight
into his concept of defense budgeting prior to his assuming actual responsi-
bilities in this area. The authors pointed out that defense plans and decisions




cannot be made on the basis of cost only or need only. Indeed, the right
question to ask is: How much is needed for defense more than is needed for
other purposes?
The first step they suggested as a means of improving the choice of
program sizes was to put budget figures into categories that more clearly
correspond to end-product missions. This would enable officials to make
better decisions concerning their importance to the nature of these missions.
The budget, designed to show the approximate costs of such missions, would
have to cross interdepartmental lines. Three broad program categories
were proposed: (1) deterrence or fighting of all-out war; (2) deterrence or
2
fighting of limited war; and (3) research and development.
They also pointed out that the decision makers would like to know
the extra or incremental program costs of the alternatives being considered.
In essence, Hitch and McKean proposed a format that embraced an integrated
Department of Defense budget. Within such a budget, the programs of indi-
vidual services would be grouped with those of other services and displayed
in the mission category toward which those particular forces are directed.
Forces and costs were to be projected some years in the future, and the
total mission could be analyzed by comparing costs and benefits of the ele-
3
ments making up the mission force.
Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense
in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I960), pp. 47-48.
2 3
Ibid.
, pp. 54-57. Ibid. , p. 57.
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Both Mr. McNamara and Mr. Hitch were convinced that the finan-
cial management system must provide the data needed by top defense man-
agement to make the really crucial decisions, particularly on the major
forces and weapon systems needed to carry out the principal missions of
the Defense establishment.
It was noted that, although unification had been achieved in form,
beginning with the National Security Act of 1947,
... It was not until 1961 that the full powers of the Secretary
of Defense to run the Department on a unified basis
. . . were
actually used. . . . This situation existed principally because
earlier Secretaries of Defense lacked the necessary tools to do so.
The tool" provided to Mr. McNamara was a new function, which
he called programming, and which was incorporated in the financial man-
agement system. "Since the military planning function and the budget
function were already well established, the role of programming was to
2
provide a bridge between the two. "
The New System
One distinction that should be made is that the system or process
set up by Mr. Hitch had as its ultimate objective the facilitation of the
decision-making process in the Department of Defense. Establishment of
this system gave recognition to the fact that the great technical complexity
p. 25.







of modern weapon systems, the lengthy developmental and procuremei
devastating combat power, and enormous costs place a tremendous prenv^^
on the selection of weapon systems for future tasks and missions. Choice
in these areas are the key decisions around which the defense program and
budget are built. To make these decisions, the Secretary of Defense needs
to know the cost of each of the systems in relation to its military effective-
ness. These costs need to be evaluated for a period longer than just one
budget year- -ideally over the entire life cycle of the system, including both
the initial investment cost and annual operating costs. He also needs to
know what the effectiveness of each system is in relation to its mission and
the alternative weapon systems available to perform that mission both now
2
and in the future.
Seven broad goals were established for the programming system,
and since this system is regarded as a tie-in between planning and budgeting,
these are in essence goals of the planning -programming -budgeting system:
1. Planning oriented around major missions . --The system is pri-
marily oriented around military forces classified in terms of independent
or related missions, as opposed to grouping the military forces of the
services separately. These mission-oriented military forces
Charles J. Hitch, "The Defense Budget as a Management Tool, "
an address before the Annual Conference of the Armed Forces Management
Association, Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C. , March 1, 1963.
2
Charles J. Hitch, "Remarks before the American Society of Mili-
tary Comptrollers, " The Pentagon, Washington, D. C. , September 21, 1961.
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constitute the output of the defense program, and therefore are the
primary focus for decision making.
2. Ability to relate resource inputs to military output . --While
each proposed force structure has its cost in dollar terms, an esti-
mate of time-phased requirements for major resources must never-
theless be made in terms of physical units, such as manpower, items
of equipment, and facilities. The system must be capable of providing
both financial and non-financial estimates of resource inputs required
to obtain a specified military output.
3. Coordination of long-range planning with budgeting. --Long-
range planning and programming decisions must be compatible with
budgets and funding decisions. The programming system must pro-
vide a means for changing approved programs for compatibility pur-
poses, if a need for a revision of programs is recognized during the
budget review process.
4. Continuous appraisal of programs. --An unnecessary contrac-
tion of decision making into a very short period of time would result
from tying defense planning to an arbitrary calendar period. It would
also result in increased time to respond to changing military needs.
While budgeting and funding are necessarily geared to an annual cycle,
this does not preclude continuous appraisal of long-range programs.
5. Progress reporting . --Control must be exercised through a
series of progress reports, and significant deviations from approved
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plans can be detected at an early enough time so that corrective action
can be taken.
6. Ability to make cost -effectiveness studies . --A routine capabil-
ity is required for making cost -effectiveness studies of alternative
force structures.
7. Integration of QSD information systems. --In view of the fact
that the programming system imposes heavy requirements on informa-
tion from the services, other reporting systems having similar require
ments must be revised to avoid duplications. The end objective should
be the development of an integrated OSD management system.
Mr. Bert Mogin, from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller), added to this list, or perhaps summarized, when
he stated that one of the objectives was "to establish a single channel for
major decisions on Defense programs. " He goes on to explain that this
has not been completely accomplished because Mr. McNamara must make
some decisions outside the programming systems, but that the Secretary
does use the programming system 'as his principal vehicle for decision
3
making. "
U. S. Department of Defense, Study Report on the Programming
System for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington: Office of the









The Five -Year Defense Plan is the foundation of the Department
of Defense Programming System and as such is the blueprint for the future.
Basically, it is the summation of all approved programs of all Department
of Defense components. It establishes for each military service an approved
force structure for eight years into the future and resource levels for five
years. By relating the resources to forces, or, in other words, inputs to
outputs, it provides the Secretary of Defense with two major planning dimen-
sions. By using one, he can aggregate the military forces required to
counter enemy threats. By using the other, he can concurrently allocate
available resources toward meeting the requirements for providing and
supporting these military forces.
The elements of the Five -Year Defense Plan can be described in
terms of three major building blocks, as follows:
1. Major programs represent aggregations of similar military
missions and supporting functions of the military services into eight
broad functional classifications:
Program I -Strategic Retaliatory Forces
Program II -Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces
Program III -General Purpose Forces
Program IV -Airlift and Sealift Forces
Program V -Reserve and Guard Forces
The Navy Programming Manual , Office of the Chief of Naval




Program VI - Research and Development
Program VII - General Support
Program VIII - Military Assistance Program
Each major program is a combination of program elements
designed to accomplish a definite objective or plan that is specific as
to the time -phasing of what is to be done and as to the means for doing
it.
2. Program elements are the smallest units of military output
controlled at the Department of Defense level. It is an integrated
activity; an identifiable military capability; a force, support activity,
research activity, etc.
,
comprising a combination of men, equipment,
and facilities. " The "Fleet Ballistic Missile System, " "Attack
Carriers, FORRESTAL Class," and Recruit Training, Navy" are
examples of program elements. All program elements taken together
constitute the complete planned output of the Defense Department. Since
each DOD activity falls within one and only one program element, the
total of all the elements taken together constitutes the total planned out-
put of the Defense Department.
Major program decisions are made in terms of program elements,
therefore the programming system requires costing by program
U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Programming System (DOD
Directive 7045. 1), October 30, 1964, p. 2.
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elements, with the cost divided into three cost categories: Research
and Development, Investment, and Operating.
3. Resource categor i es include either unique types of resources
or homogeneous groupings of related resources. There are four
major types of resource categories: (1) items of equipment, (2) man-
power, (3) military construction, and (4) the functions and activities
financed under Operation and Maintenance appropriations. Just as in
the case of program elements, the sum of all resource categories
equals total resources input since every resource input falls within
one and only one resource category.
The Five -Year Defence Plan, as its foundation, and the planning -
programming -budgeting structure provide definition of areas of activity
within which alternative courses of action can be treated and decisions made
with some knowledge of the effects of those decisions on our national defense
posture.
The major elements of the programming system are: a program
structure of objectives in terms of missions and forces as described above;
the analytical comparison of alternative means oi achieving the objective; a
continually updated Five -Year Defense Plan; and related year-round decision
2
making on new programs and changes. The implementation of this system
The Navy Programming Manual
,
op. cit.
, p. I - 3 - 1
.
Z
David Novick, Program Budgeting: Program Analysis and the
Federal Budget (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 57.
A RAND Corporation publication.

23
makes it possible to incorporate the three interdependent and interrelated
approaches toward the achievement of efficiencies in military decisions as
described by Hitch and McKean:
The improvement of institutional arrangements within the govern-
ment to promote efficiency . . . improve budgeting and accounting
methods, attempt to provide more appropriate incentives, and reor-
ganize the apparatus of decision making. . . .
Increased reliance on systematic quantitative analysis to deter-
mine the most efficient alternative allocations and methods; . . .
Increased recognition and awareness that military decisions,
whether they specifically involve budgetary allocations or not are in
one of their most important aspects economic decisions; and that un-
less the right questions are asked, the appropriate alternatives
selected for comparison, and an economic criterion used for choosing
the most efficient, military power and national security will suffer. *




SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND PLANNING, PROGRAMMING,
AND BUDGETING
Definition and Role
The Program Budgeting system described in the preceding chapter
and as viewed by the Secretary of Defense has become the framework, or
the design, within which defense decisions are made. Mr. G. H. Fisher, in
a presentation for a conference on program budgeting, makes the observa-
tion that in many cases people have tended to focus on the structural format
of programming, neglecting the analytical parts of the system. This, he
states, is a great error in emphasis. Many of the most important benefits
of the programming system are not realized without establishing analytical
activity "to generate and specify alternative future courses of action, to
systematically explore the implications of the alternatives in terms of pos-
sible benefits and costs, and to present the results to the planning decision
makers in such a way as to sharpen their intuition and judgment. "
Over -emphasis of the role of systems analysis can also be a great
mistake. In no case should it be assumed that the systems analyst or the
Gene H. Fisher, The World of Program Budgeting , A Presentation
to a Conference on Program Budgeting and Cost Analysis, University of





results of the analysis will "make" the decision. Especially in the Depart-
ment of Defense, the problems are too difficult, with too many intangible
considerations that cannot be taken in account in an analytical process, at
least not in a quantitative sense. For example, the political, psychological,
and sociological considerations must bear influence on major decisions made
in most areas of defense posture. The analytical process should therefore
be significant in its application as it is directed toward assisting the decision
maker in such a way that his intuition and judgment are better than they
would be without the results of the analysis. Dr. Alain Enthoven, the Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), finding difficulty in the defini-
tion of the term "Systems Analysis, " says:
Where does this leave us? v/hat is operations research or sys-
tems analysis at the Defense policy level all about? I think that it can
best be described as a continuing dialogue between the policy maker
and the systems analyst, in which the policy maker asks for alterna-
tive solutions to his problems, makes decisions to exclude some, and
make 8 value judgments and policy decisions, while the analyst attempts
to clarify the conceptual framework in which decisions must be made,
to define alternative possible objectives and criteria, and to explore in
as clear terms as possible (and quantitatively) the cost and effective-
ness of alternative courses of action.
The analyst at this level is not computing optimum solutions or
making decisions. In fact, computation is not his most important con-
tribution. And he is helping someone else to make decisions. His job
is to ask and find answers to the questions: "What are we trying to do?"
"What are the alternative ways of achieving it?" "What would they cost,
and how effective would they be?" What does the decision maker need
to know in order to make a choice? And to collect and organize this
information for those who are responsible for deciding what the Defense
program ought to be. *
Alain Enthoven, "Decision Theory and Systems Analysis, ' The
Armed Forces Comptroller, IX, No. 1 (March, 1964), 39.
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There are many definitions, or at least variations of definitions, of
the term systems analysis. " Some believe, for example, that systems
analysis is a form of operations research or a cost -effectiveness approach.
Others feel that operations research and cost-effectiveness studies are a
part of the systems analysis approach. As seen from the above,
Dr. Enthoven relates that even he has trouble producing a good brief defini-
tion. It is possible, then, to assume that definition is of little relative
importance. Prior to an evaluation of the systems analysis approach, how-
ever, it is necessary to see how the organization and operation of the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) is accommodated
by the Planning -Programming -Budgeting system.
Organization
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) --OASD(SA)-
was established in September, 1965. Prior to this time systems analysis
was a function of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and
Dr. Enthoven was designated as a Deputy Assistant Secretary. The charter
for OASD(SA) prescribed certain responsibilities, functions, and authorities.
The responsibilities are: (1) to review quantitative requirements, including
forces, weapon systems, equipment, and personnel for the Secretary of
Defense; (2) to assist the Secretary in the initiation, monitoring, guiding,
and reviewing of requirements and cost -effectiveness studies; (3) to encour-
age, throughout the Department of Defense, the use of the best analytical
n
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methods; and (4) to conduct special studies when directed by the Secretary.
Authority was granted to communicate directly with heads of all DOD com-
ponents; to issue instructions and directives; and to obtain such information,
advice, and assistance from DOD components as he deems necessary.
In order to carry out its responsibilities, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) is organized along mission lines
coincident with the programs described in the discussion of the Planning-
Programming -Budgeting system. The missions are divided into two basic
areas, with a Deputy Assistant Secretary in charge of each. These two
areas are Strategic Programs and General Purpose Programs, both of
which are further divided into mission teams--e. g. , Strategic Defense
Team, Strategic Retaliatory Team- -under Strategic Programs; and Army-
Marine Corps Land Forces Team, Mobility and Transportation Team, under
General Purpose Programs.
Although these are the major divisions, there is a division for
Resource Analysis, subdivided into cost analysis and manpower analysis
sections. The talent in these sections spend most of their time as tempo-
rary members of, or as advisors to, the mission -oriented teams mentioned
above. There is also a division for analysis of the economic impact of
recommended decisions, and one for command, control, communications,
and intelligence. Presently, there is a special division reporting directly
U.S. Department of Defense, Charter for the Assistant Secretary




to Dr. Enthoven for matters pertaining to Southeast Asia Programs.
The organization contains 140 professional people, of whom forty-
nine are military, representing each of the military services. Less than
half of the professionals have operations research or systems analysis
backgrounds. They range from economists to engineers, and from aviators
to supply specialists.
Operation
The formal operation of the Systems Analysis Office is interwoven
with the DOD Planning -Programming -Budgeting cycle and can be described
in relation to that cycle. It is also convenient to divide the type of analysis
applied into two conceptual approaches: fixed -utility approach and fixed
-
2budget approach.
The fixed -utility approach is used during the programming phase
of the cycle. The first step is to determine a specified level of utility to be
attained in the accomplishment of some given objective. The analysis then
attempts to determine that alternative (or feasible combination of alterna-
tives) which is likely to achieve specified levels of utility at lowest cost.
The fixed -budget approach adds one more constraint, that of specified limits
of funds, and is used during the budgeting phase of the cycle. More will be
developed on these approaches from an economic benefit-cost viewpoint in
the next chapter. They are mentioned at this time to give perspective to
Organization Chart of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Systems Analysis), April, 1966.
2
Fisher, op. cit. , pp. 14-15.
.qua oJ
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the analysis taking place during the annual programming -budgeting cycle.
Programming is a continuing exercise in updating and correcting
the Five -Year Defense Plan and gaining approval for new programs from the
Secretary of Defense. Because the procedure is continuing, one could start
at any point during the calendar year to describe the interaction of systems
analysis, but for convenience of description it is well to begin with the pub-
lication of the Plan on January 1 of each year. At this point, each of the
services, through their individual Secretaries, submits a list of recommen-
dations for Major Force Oriented Issues (MFOI). These are reviewed by
the OASD(SA) and recommendations are made to the Secretary who, upon
review, publishes a list of all major force -oriented issues requiring resolu-
tion. No attempt is made at this time to resolve the issues.
This procedure has not been fully tested since its inception in the
calendar year 1966 cycle. McKinsey and Company, Inc. , a leading manage-
ment consulting firm, is presently involved in a review of their recommen-
dations. The service Secretaries this year submitted a rather comprehen-
sive list of relatively specific and major issues which they felt required
resolution. The Secretary of Defense approved list of MFOI's was more
comprehensive than any of those submitted by the individual service Secre-
taries, but each of the issues appeared very broad in scope and not as
Memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
from McKinsey and Company, Inc. , January 5, 1966, p. 8.
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restrictive as might have been hoped for in the McKinsey recommendations.
The next step is the receipt of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
(JSOP), which is prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the assistance of
the planners in the military departments. Until 1966, the JSOP was a
"wishing list" for each of the military services and served very little pur-
pose in OSD because it was too broad in nature and merely stated needs with
no alternative courses of action.
Through the cajoling of OASD(SA), the 1966 JSOP specified man-
power and cost considerations and provided some alternative courses of
action costed out. It also provided some estimation of risk implied in each
2
alternative. Admittedly, this was a rough attempt at providing the Secre-
tary of Defense with a document which could be useful to him and his staff
of analysts, and it is hoped that the 1967 JSOP will be much better. With
some further refinements it is hoped that the JSOP will become the basis
for future force decisions.
From April to sometime in June or early July, the OASD(SA) staff
makes detailed analyses of the current FYBP, JSOP, and special studies
and their interrelationships with the Major Force Oriented Issues and other
current areas of importance and prepares the initial draft of the Presidential
Memoranda. This represents one of the principal products of OiVSD(SA);
U.S. Department of the Navy, files of the Office of Chief of Naval
Operations, Systems Analysis (Code OP 96), March, 1967.
2
Herbert Anderson, Capt. , USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (Code OP 90B), Speech before the Navy Financial Management students,
The George Washington University, November 30, 1966.
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and the process of analysis, which will be described in detail later in thi^
paper, becomes daily routine for the analysts.
A brief explanation of the systems analysis process is necessary
at this time to show how the OASD(SA) aids Mr. McNamara in his decision
on Presidential Memoranda. The first step is to define or redefine objec-
tives. For example, if a broad objective of the Navy is "control of the
sea, ' the analyst must decide on some measurable goal within the broad
objective, the accomplishment of which he can use in his analysis. One of
the reasons for control ot the sea is to insure X tons of supplies per day to
some war zone. Within this definition, effectiveness can be measured--
X tons delivered.
The next step is to identify the feasible alternative means of
accomplishing the objective. This year it is hoped that the analyst could
refer to the JSOP to determine the JCS alternatives. As a seeker of alter-
natives himself, he may generate some new ones. For example, he may
weigh the advantages, disadvantages, and costs of airlift, sealift, and pre-
positioning of material close to potential hot spots. " He may even, at this
time, question or recast the objective, Y tons rather than X tons, if the cost
of all alternatives exceeds reasonable attainable capability or expenditure.
The next step is to rank the alternatives in order of their cost/
effectiveness ratios. It is important here to point out that the ranking is
Personal interview with LCdr. M. Staser Holcomb, USN, Analyst,




not done on cost alone. It is also important to realize that maximum effec-
tiveness at any cost is impractical. The approach used is a time-phased
cost and effectiveness analysis extending at least through the five-year span
of the Five -Year Defense Plan. The cost figures used are original acquisi-
tion costs plus reasonable expectations of recurring cost. Effectiveness
is measured by approximations of the ability to accomplish the objective --
in the above example, deliver X tons.
Presented with this kind of analysis, Mr. McNamara must then
integrate cost effectiveness with other judgments --economic, political,
military, operational, and technical --in order to make his decision. These
decisions then become the Initial Draft Presidential Memoranda (IDPM).
These documents go not only to the President, but to the military services
showing the areas where changes or continuations of the Five -Year Defense
Plan have been tentatively decided on.
These memoranda are the primary tools for the Secretary of
Defense to solicit comments from the military services concerning conflict
between their plans and his. They are very general in nature and require
detailed Program Change Requests (PCR's) from the services showing their
interpretation of the requirements to carry out the provisions of the IDPM.
There are really three types of documents required at this time from the
services: (1) detailed Program Change Requests to implement the decision
as outlined in the entire IDPM; (2) reclama for the elements of the IDPM
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with which the service takes exception; and (3) detailed Program Change
Requests to implement the position taken in the reclama.
The services have thirty days from issuance of the Draft Presiden-
tial Memoranda in which to prepare detailed Program Change Requests
required to implement the decisions into the Five -Year Defense Plan, or to
reclama the decision outlined in the DPM. During July and August, the
service and JCS comments are received and a process similar to that
described above is applied to any new data provided by the services. By
August 31, all Program Change Requests are due in OASD(SA) whether they
are implementations of the DPM or recommendations based on the service
reclama. The PCR's, as implied earlier, are very detailed, showing man-
power and other resource requirements necessary to accomplish the pro-
posed changes in the Five-Year Defense Plan.
The OSD systems analysts again subject these proposals to the
detailed analysis shown above and make recommendations to the Secretary
with a ranking of alternatives. During the months of August and September,
the Secretary of Defense returns his Program Change decisions to the
services for inclusion in their budgets.
Meanwhile, the Final Draft Presidential Memoranda are being pre-
pared, incorporating the service positions and the interim decisions made
by Mr. McNamara on the service reclamas and the PCR's. These memo-
randa are scheduled for publication by October 1 and contain a section
showing three positions, as follows: (1) the "old" position as described in
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the updated Five-Year Defense Plan, which was published on January 1;
(2) the current decision of the Secretary of Defense on the proposal; and
(3) the service/JGS position on the proposal. The services again have an
opportunity for reclama if any new facts or bits of information have been
found that could bear on the decision. A four-day limit is placed on the sub-
mission of such a reclama.
During October and November, budget reviews are held with the
services and OASD (Comptroller). During these reviews, a representative
from the Office of Systems Analysis is present.
It is at this point that a dichotomy develops. " Mr. McNamara has
provided guidance to the Comptroller on the limits of the Defense Budget
which cannot be exceeded. This means that he could on the one hand be
approving a service program through the programming phase, and on the
other disallow the program through fund constraints in the budget phase.
It is at this time that the concept of analysis changes from the fixed-
utility approach to the fixed -budget approach. For the systems analyst, this
M. Stacer Holcomb, LCdr, USN, Analyst, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), Speech before the Navy Financial
Management students, The George Washington University, December 14,
1966. Most of the materials covering the timetable of events and elements
of systems analysis and the programming -budgeting system were accumu-
lated during the speech, but were supplemented by personal interviews with
LCdr. Holcomb and with Captain Charles Woods, USN; Cdr. Wayne Hughes,
USN; LCdr. Shelby Clark, SC, USN; and LCdr. Jack Haregrove, USN,




means adding one more constraint: available funds. Given a "specified
budget level to be used in the attainment of some objective, the analyst
attempts to determine the alternative (or feasible combination of alterna-
tives) which is likely to produce the highest utility for the given budget
level. He must again review the alternatives and objectives previously
considered in the fixed-utility analysis with the added constraint of a fixed
amount of money rather than "lowest possible cost. "
It is interesting to note that the analyst who had been so "hard
nosed" in the programming phase concerning costs and justifications now
becomes the program's staunchest supporter when faced with the budget
limitation and becomes just as ' hard nosed" about accepting something less
2
than the previously chosen alternative.
This completes the yearly cycle and, with publication of the new
updated Five-Year Defense Plan, the next year's cycle begins.
This, then, is the formal structure of the PPBS within which sys-
tems analysis plays its part. In the "continuing dialogue" that Dr. Enthoven
refers to, there are many informal communications between the analysts
and the program sponsors from the services which take place within the
structure. For example, knowing that the Initial Draft Presidential Memo-
randa are critical to the future programs of the DOD, each military service








special interest. This information can be in the form of special studies,
either internal or contract studies, and, in the case of the Navy, "Program
Objectives" (PO), giving force level objectives approved by the Secretary.
For the Navy, these represent the level to which the Secretary of the Navy
supports the objectives established by the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps in the JSOP. These documents highlight
for the analyst, and provide in greater detail, the portions of the JSOP in
which the Navy has special interest.
Additionally, the OSD analysts are in daily contact with the service
planners attempting to get from them the information required by the Secre-
tary of Defense and in the form necessary to enable him to make his decision.
The OSD analysts are invited to meetings and conferences held by the servi-
ces concerning subjects of special interest to them to keep them current on
problems and technological advancements being made in their areas. It is
through these informal communications networks that the OSD analyst
2
receives most of the data used in their systematic economic analyses.
The framework of the Planning -Programming -Budgeting System is
therefore the design within which Mr. McNamara makes his decisions and
the continuous updating of the Five-Year Defense Plan is the blueprint for
U.S. Department of the Navy, "The Navy Planning and Program-
ming System, " Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Instruction 5000. 19E,
January 12, 1967, p. 5.
2
Personal interview with an analyst, Office of the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Systems Analysis), March 8, 1967.
.
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the future, or, more basically, the summation of all approved programs of
all Department of Defense components.
Mr. Samuel M. Greenhouse of the Veterans Administration, for
purposes of tying systems analysis to PPBS and yet differentiating between
the two, says:
PPBS may be captioned as a bag of premises, concepts and rela-
tionships; whereas systems analysis may be captioned as a bag of
techniques attached to a way of approaching problems. *
He goes on to talk about what systems analysis is, in so far as PPBS is
concerned:
Systems analysis is the application of 'benefit -cost" analytical
techniques to several areas of the PPBS anatomy. ^
Program budgeting and systems analysis are not the same, but
they have an affinity for each other. The program budget expedites the
decision-maker's review by describing the magnitude of major Defense
Department programs and functions in terms of need, their relation to
other programs, and the proportion of total defense expenditures. It also,
through systems analysis, identifies the most efficient and economical of
the possible arrangements of the work. In the words of Novick, "Program
budgeting starts with the structuring of the problem and ends with analysis
3
of the date. »
Samuel M. Greenhouse, "The Planning -Programming -Budgeting
System: Rationale Language, and Idea -Relationships, " Public Administra-
tion Review, December, 1966, p. 276.
2 3
Ibid. Novick, op. cit. , p. xii.

CHAPTER IV
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
Essential Features
Dr. Enthoven's operation in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Systems Analysis), as it relates to the dec ision -making process of
the Secretary, is viewed by him as applied economic analysis. He says:
Economics is the science of the allocation of limited resources;
the study of both how our economic system actually allocates resources
and how it might be done more efficiently. . . . Whether we like it or
not, we have a limited amount of goods and services available at any
one time.
It is within these limited resources that major decisions on force
levels and weapons systems are made. Every systems analysis involves,
sometime during its process, the comparison of alternative courses of
action in terms of their costs and their related eitectiveness in attaining a
specified objective. This comparison, in an economic sense, takes the
form of an attempt to designate the alternative that will minimize the costs,
subject to some fixed performance requirement; or, conversely, it is an
attempt to maximize some physical measure of performance subject to a
budget constraint. This is the fixed- utility or fixed -budget approach to
Alain Enthoven, Systems Analysis and the Navy, " Naval Review




economic analysis described briefly in Chapter III.
Such an evaluation is known as cost-effectiveness analysis, or,
alternatively, cost -utility and cost -benefit analysis. It is in reality what
economists describe as a marginal -cost and marginal -product analysis or
a projection of how many increments of output will be received for the next
additional increment of input. Cost -effectiveness studies are only part of
the systems analysis approach. In analyses designed to furnish broad policy
advice, other facets of the problem are of equal significance: the specifica-
tion of sensible objectives, the identification or design of alternatives to
achieve those objectives, and other assumptions underlying the analysis;
the opening of new alternatives; and the possible establishment and justifica-
2
tion of new objectives.
There are some fundamental ideas of economics that are relevant
to systems analysis. In the notion of economics there are always alterna-
tives. There are alternative ways of using resources, alternative ways of
doing a job, even alternative objectives to be achieved. Therefore, when an
economist hears that a missile must have a range of 3, 500 miles, he
instinctively questions whether 3,000 miles or 4,000 miles might be better.
Much of economic theory is concerned with the comparison of alternative









regards the number of targets within the various ranges and the relative
importance of these targets to the enemy.
Other economic considerations would involve the number of mis-
siles to be employed. Of particular interest to the economist in this case
is the marginal comparison. Dr. Enthoven uses, as his example, the
comparison between costs and target destruction capabilities of a force
of missiles with an expected percentage of target kill for each missile.
Marginal-cost and marginal -product analysis can be used to describe the
situation for the decision maker wherein a certain number of additional
missiles are required to destroy one additional target.
The description would illustrate the widespread incidents of dimin-
ishing marginal returns --that is, as the resources are increased in the
given mission, after a point, the product or effectiveness would increase
at a declining rate. To put it another way, the incremental cost of each
increment of increased effectiveness rises. The decision maker can then
judge at what point the extra effectiveness resulting from more forces is
no longer worth the extra effort, rather than viewing the problem of mili-
tary requirements determination as one of calculation of forces required
to achieve an arbitrary selection of objective. This allows him to question
objectives through comparison of alternative force sizes.
The economist would also view the objective in terms of an efficient
mix of forces. This economic theory is an analysis of what is referred to





in the Department of Defense as balance of forces. If the problem is to
determine the efficient mix of X forces and Y forces, the first thing the
economist would do is to determine the substitution possibilities. This
analysis would determine various mixes of X and Y which would satisfy the
objective. After this determination is made, a cost analysis of X forces and
Y forces applied to the various mixes would illustrate the most economical
combination of forces to accomplish the objective.
The same logical analysis can be made to the questions concerning
increased quality at the sacrifice of quantity. To determine the optimum
combination of "high quality - low quantity" or "lower quality - higher
quantity' selections, it remains a problem of finding at which point the
most economic quality and quantity mix is reachec". This comparison can
again be made between determination of accuracy and reliability in measures
of effectiveness. These economic approaches to decision making will be
discussed later in the study of systems analysis applications.
In this economic approach to systems analysis, there is no unique
method to be followed, but, according to Mr. E. S. Quade, there are sev-
eral stages through which analysis must advance: formulation; search;
2
explanation; and interpretation.
The formulation phase attempts to isolate the questions involved to





E. S. Quade, Military Systems Analysis (Santa Monica: The RAND
Corporation, January, 1963), pp. 7-8.
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to state the relationships among these factors. This is the most important
stage, because the process of restating the problem in different ways,
redefining it, or expressing its limits will tend to identify whether the mat-
ter under consideration with its factors is significant and could point the way
to its solution. Mr. Quade's advice here is not to accept the original state-
ment from the customer' of what is wanted exactly as proposed. "In fact,
because the concern is with the future, the major job may be to decide what
the policy maker should want to do. "
The search phase is concerned with finding the facts on which the
analysis is based. During this phase, it may become necessary to look for
different ideas, with evidence to support them, and in fact invent new alter-
natives, as well as look for facts. Unless there are alternatives and ideas
about them, there is nothing to choose between and therefore no analysis.
An example of the invention of alternatives through analysis is
2
cited by Mr. Hitch. Early analyses of means to rapidly deploy forces to
troubled spots around the world centered on the need to determine the most
economical type of aircraft to procure for that purpose. Sealift, it was
established, was much too slow to warrant consideration as an alternative.
Included in the analysis as an alternative, however, was extensive pre-












One of the major deficiencies in this alternative was the likelihood that the
pre -positioned stocks would be in the wrong country, or even the wrong
continent, when hostilities actually threatened to break out. The analyst's
invention was to pre -position stocks on ships. When this alternative was
added to the analysis, it substantially augmented the airlift rapid deployment
capability.
In some cases during the search phase, however, the total number
of alternatives may be endless. It then becomes a problem of limiting the
alternatives to the most feasible in order to perform a meaningful economic
study.
The explanation phase is essentially a listing of the alternatives and
an examination of their implications and costs in order that they may be com
pared. After obtaining some idea of what the facts and alternatives are, it
is necessary to construct them in such a way as to explain them and to deter-
mine their implications. In order to make much progress with real-world
problems, we must ignore a great many of the actual features of a question
under study and "abstract from the real situation certain aspects, hopefully,
the relevant ones, which together make up an idealized version of the real
situation. " This idealization, wherein elements can be controlled and
manipulated to provide information as to results of certain decisions, is
called a model.
Quade, Military Systems Analysis , op. cit. , p. 17.
mk m
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All of the assumptions of the model must be made explicit. Since,
generally speaking, there is often a variety of sets of assumptions available
to the analyst and, as shown above, he must select from this variety, the
analyst must describe the significant alternative sets of assumptions and
their implications in such a way that the responsible decision maker can
make his judgment based on the full range of relevant assumptions. "
The interpretation phase is a critical examination of the results
obtained from the model. The recommended solution must be viewed in the
light of considerations which may not have been adequately treated by the
model, since the model, as described, is an idealization of the real world
chosen by the analyst.
Within the conceptual framework of fixed -utility and fixed -budget
approaches to systems analysis, Mr. Fisher sets forth some important
guidelines to be followed in order to make the economic diagnosis of the
2
problem situation meaningful and of value to the decision maker.
Proper structuring of the problem and design of the analysis is the
most important guideline. Within the extremely complex environment
of the Department of Defense, thoie items which are relevant must be
included and separated from those which are irrelevant. In other words,
the problem must be so structured that the right questions are being







asked. It is probable that during some phase the design of the analysis
will have to be restructured. Factors that seemed important originally
may turn out to be relatively unimportant in the restructuring, and
vice versa. In the process, as implied earlier, new questions, new
objectives, or new alternatives may become obvious.
Building the analytical model is a simplified representation of the
real world that includes and highlights the cause -and -effect relation-
ships essential to the question studied. The means of representation
may be a set of mathematical equations or a computer program or
merely a verbal description of the situation. The role of the model is
to estimate for each alternative the costs that would be incurred and
the extent to which the objectives would be attained.
Uncertainty is recognized, and an attempt is made to take it into
account. Fisher divides uncertainty into two main types: statistical
uncertainty, which stems from purely chance elements of the real
world; and uncertainties about the enemy's actions and reactions to
given situations or technological advances that cannot be foreseen
accurately.
There are three techniques used in the problem of dealing with
uncertainty: sensitivity analysis, contingency analysis, and a fortiori
analysis. In sensitivity analysis, several values are used (high,
medium, and low), rather than one expected value, in order to deter-
mine how sensitive the alternative would be to these variations. In
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contingency analysis, an investigation is made to see how the relative
ranking of an alternative holds up by assuming changes in the general
environment being considered. A fortiori analysis is used when the
generally accepted intuitive judgment strongly favors alternative A,
while the analyst feels that alternative B may be preferable. The ana-
lyst deliberately chooses to resolve the uncertainties in favor of A;
and if his choice of B still looks good, he has a strong case favoring
alternative B.
Treatment of problems associated with time further complicates
the selection of a criterion for evaluating alternatives since one alter-
native may be best for this year, but another alternative may be better
five years from now. This means that each of the alternatives has to
be discounted" through time by means of an appropriate rate of dis-
count. More will be discussed on this point when specific analyses are
presented.
Validity checking of the model determines whether the analytical
procedure used is a reasonably good representation of reality. It is
generally not possible to do this accurately when the problems that
have time horizon considerations are involved, because the model is
merely a representation of reality as it is known today with estimates




Qualitative supplementation is an integral part of the total analysis.
It is necessary to interpret the quantitative results and to discuss and
point out to the decision maker the non -quantitative considerations that
could not be taken into account and their possible impact on the alterna-
tives studied.
As can be seen from the above guidelines, there is an attempt to
apply a "scientific method" to problems of economic choice. Systems analy-
sis, particularly of the type required for military decisions, is still largely
a form of art and not of science. Using Mr. Fisher's guidelines, however,
it is possible to establish a systematic approach to economic choice.
The need for systematic quantitative analysis in Defense is much
more important than in the private sector of the economy. Seldom is there
found one person who has an intuitive grasp of all the fields of knowledge that
are relevant to the complex major defense problems. It would be possible
in some areas to assemble a group of experts who, after discussion, could
emerge with a fairly substantial answer. In general, however, and espe-
cially when the choice is not between two but among many alternatives, sys-
2
tematic analysis is essential for the decision maker. Further, in contrast
to the private sector where competition provides an incentive for efficiency
E. S. Quade, Systems Analysis Techniques for Planning-
Programming -Budgeting (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, March,
1966), p. 20.
2




through the profit motive, efficiency in government depends on the conscious
and deliberate selection of techniques and policies. Wherever the relevant
factors are diverse and complex, as they usually are in defense problems,
unaided intuition or past experience alone is incapable of weighing them and
reaching sound judgments on the balancing of programs and systems.
The need for systems analysis exists not only in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, but at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level and in the head-
quarters of the military departments. The purpose of the function is to help
reduce the uncertainties in making choices among alternatives. This is not
to say that uncertainties do not exist, but, rather than conceal them, a good
analysis will bring them out.
The objective of the attempt of the economic approach to military
decisions has been to build an integrated structure of systems analysis
throughout the Department of Defense with the broadest kind of exchange of
information techniques at and between the services and the various levels
within the Department. This arrangement provides the checks and balances
so essential to minimizing parochial viewpoints and organizational bias.
The systems analyst must also be prepared to submit his work to critical
scrutiny.
There is one of the scientific characteristics that can be applied
to systems analysis and that is that it is an "open, explicit, verifiable,





self -correcting process. " The objectivity of the method also makes it
imperative that the military departments embrace its approach in their
presentations to Mr. McNamara because he makes his attitude explicitly
known with the following statement:
I expect Defense executives to develop their portion of the
national military strategy, operating plans, force structures,
budgets, etc.
,
based on reason rather than emotion.
Recognized Benefits and Limitations
Benefits
Prior to World War II, military technology changed slowly. Mili-
tary operations experience could relate new weapons, which were essentially
product improvements, to forces and in turn to strategy. The technological
explosion experienced since that time has, however, opened an enormous
range of possible directions that the defense of this country could take. The
buildable new weapons are fundamentally different from old weapons and the
possible mix in application of these weapons is unlimited. The nation,
although affluent, cannot afford to pursue all possible objectives. 'Thus,
3
military studies have become military-economic studies. "
Alain C. Enthoven, "Choosing Strategies and Selecting vVeapon




"Defense Decision Making as McNamara Sees It, " Armed Forces
lanagement
, November 1963, p. 16.
3
"How the Budget Decisions are Reached, " Armed Forces
Management
,
April, 1963, p. 13.
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These military economic studies, embraced by systems analysts,
allow a sorting and an identification of the complex questions of national
defense. Without calculations, there is no way to get the answers to many
of these increasingly complex defense systems and their interrelationship
problems. Analysis offers an alternative to muddling through or to set-
tling national problems by yielding to the strongest pressure group.
Systems analysis falls short of being scientific research because
its predictions ordinarily cannot be verified and the urgency of military
problems forces the substitution ol intuition for verifiable knowledge. But,
in contrast to other aids to decision making, it extracts everything possible
from scientific methods by advancing through systematic stages of process.
Its virtue, in fact, lies in the increased ability to take a "cold, hard look
which individuals or organizations directly involved in the problem find dif-
ficult to take. " As applied in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Systems Analysis), these analyses provide the Secretary of
Defense with an objective overview of the total DOD posture. Being given
an estimate of the costs, risks, payoffs, and the associated time span for
each course of action, the Secretary of Defense is helped to understand the
relevant alternative actions available to him and the key interactions of his
decisions. The systems analyst may, by skillful questioning of the services,
introduce new alternatives or bring about changes in objectives to make
George H. Decker, "Costing Strategy, " Armed Forces Manage-




The studies presented to Mr. McNamara should sharpen his intui-
tion and certainly broaden his basis for judgment. It therefore follows that
he should be in a position to make better decisions. Although value judg-
ments, imprecise knowledge, intuitive estimates, and uncertainties about
the action of others are ail part of the systems analysis approach, the
philosophy of systems analysis is reflected on a sign in Dr. Enthoven's




Every systems analysis has defects. Some of these are limita-
tions inherent in all analyses of choice. Others are a consequence
of the difficulties and complexities of the question. Still others are
blunders or errors in thinking, which hopefully will disappear as we
learn to do better and more complete analyses. 2
The oppsite of analysis is pure intuition. Intuition is in no sense
analytic, since little or no effort is made to structure the problem or to
establish interrelationships and their cau^e and effect in order to arrive at
a solution. Pure intuition has its defects, but seldom are they recognized
or admitted by the decision maker using that method.
This is not to say that judgment and intuition are not components of
systems analysis; they actually play an important role. They are used in
Holcomb, op. cit .
2Quade, Systems Analysis Techniques for Planning -Programming -
Budgeting
,
op. cit. , p. 19.
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designing the models; in deciding on alternatives to be considered; in deciding
on the relevant factors; and in interpreting the results. The pitfalls of analy-
sis are in these areas. For example, the analyst may limit the problem to
what he "feels" the boss may want to see; he may fail to recognize such
factors as military posture, political purpose, or technical feasibility; or
he may take too seriously the apparently precise results that seem to come
with such high-precision analysis, forgetting that the analysis was based on
little more than judgment and intuition. The decision maker should be alert
to these pitfalls as he weights the merits of any analytical study. Therefore,
all ecological factors bearing on the analysis must be brought to his attention
when the recommendations are presented.
Besides these pitfalls, there are some inherent limitations of sys-
tems analysis itself as applied to PPBS. The first of these is that the analy-
sis is necessarily incomplete. The inquiry is limited by time and money
costs. Time considerations are particularly important in the Department
of Defense and in military analysis, because the decision maker can gener-
ally not wait long for an answer. The cost of gaining complete information
is often prohibitive. For example, it would be interesting to know what the
effect on the Southeast Asian situation would be if the city of Hanoi were
bombed. To find out, one could drop the bomb, but clearly this is too costly
a means of getting complete information. Even without time or money cost
Quade, Military Systems Analysis , op. cit. , pp. 15-16.
[.
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limitations, however, analysis can never treat all of the considerations that
may be relevant. Many are too intangible --for example, national emotion,
political expedience, and morality matters.
The second inherent limitation of the systems analysis approach is
that measures of effectiveness are satisfactory approximations at best. No
one, for example, can say what the effectiveness of some deterrent action
would be since, even with the best intelligence reports, the mind of the
enemy cannot be read. The pending decision concerning the anti -ballistic
missile missile is an example.
Thirdly, there is no satisfactory way to predict the future. The
range of possible cold-war hot spots is almost limitless. A force could be
built to thwart an all-out aggression- -if that were the extent of our concern.
We could design a force structure for a particular war in a particular place
that would make optimal use of our resources --if we actually became
involved in that particular war in that particular place. Systems analysis
cannot predict these conditions, nor can any other system.
Despite these limitations and pitfalls, careful consideration of
whatever relevant matters can be discovered is beneficial to the formulation
of decisions. The important thing is that reliance on the systems analysis





The proponents of systems analysis argue that the economics of
choice is neither new nor should it seem strange or mysterious to anyone.
They argue that many systems analysis approaches are used in everyday
life. One example given is that systems analysis is no different from the
activity of a housewife shopping for bargains while making the rounds of
several grocery stores or by merely searching through the newspaper for
the best buy on some items required. A slightly more complicated, yet
homely version of the systems analysis approach was described by LCdr.
Holcomb of the OASD(SA) staff.
When the old family car breaks down, the problem is what to do
about its replacement. Several alternatives can, of course, be considered
and the relevant data applied to these alternatives. For example, it could
be repaired; it could be replaced with the same kind of car; it could be
replaced with a more austere model; it could be replaced with a foreign
model; it could be replaced by a more expensive model with air conditioning;
or it could be entirely disregarded --neither replaced nor repaired --and the





considerations of need, cost, utility, continued expense, available funds,
terms of finance, and even the size of the garage all enter into the decision.
The implication is that without cost-effectiveness analysis everyone would
be driving Cadillacs.
Mr. Hitch declares that cost -effectiveness studies or systems
analyses are needed in the Department of Defense to determine "how much
is enough. " The military requirements, as stated presently, tend to be in
absolute terms. Traditionally, military requirements studies were typified
by calculations of forces required to achieve a single hypothesized objective.
A simplified example is provided by Mr. Hitch to show the differ-
ence between the traditional method of calculation and the new economic
2
approach. This example supposes that the objective was to achieve an
expectation of destroying 97 per cent of 100 targets, using missiles having a
50 per cent single-shot kill capability. The traditional requirements study
would conclude that 500 missiles were needed because: 100 missiles would
achieve an expectance of 50 kills; 200 missiles, 75 kills; 300 missiles, 87
kills; 400 missiles, 94 kills; and 500 missiles, 97 kills. This, of course,
merely reflects the operation oi the familiar law of diminishing returns. The
significant point is that the last 100 missiles would increase the kill expecta-
tion by only three extra targets, from 94 to 97. Using economic analysis,
p. 66.






several questions should be asked: "Do we need a capability to destroy
97 per cent of the 100 targets?" Or, "Is the capability to raise target
destruction from 94 to 97 per cent worth the cost of 100 extra missiles?"
In other words, not only total costs and total products should be examined,
but also marginal costs and marginal products.
Interface of QSD Systems Analysis
and the Navy
One of the most widely publicized and perhaps most critically
appraised decisions of economic choice that affected the Navy was the deci-
sion not to construct nuclear -powered ships as recommended by the Navy
and to proceed with conventional ship construction, specifically in the case
of the aircraft carriers USS America and the USS John F. Kennedy.
The discussions center on the economic approach itself and its use-
fulness in military decision making. Some critics contend that economics
has nothing to do with weapons systems and military requirements. Others
state that military requirements and economics can be related in peacetime,
but that during wartime, when military budgets are virtually unlimited,
economics is irrelevant. Dr. Enthoven explains that these lines of criticism
are wrong and repeats that we have only a limited amount of goods and
services available at any one time. " For one thing, there are only so
many man hours available for productive activity and even during war there








are other things needed besides defense; food, clothing, housing, education,
and medical services are still required. His point, therefore, is that "in
peace or in war, only a limited amount of resources is available for defense.
... It is important that we use those resources well. "
This basic economic fact is the basis of the position of the Secretary
of Defense concerning the nuclear/conventional carrier controversy. The
construction cost of a conventional carrier is about $280 million. It would
have cost over $400 million to make the carrier nuclear -powered. The
economic argument follows that, given $400 million, it is possible to build
one conventionally powered carrier plus four destroyer escorts or one
nuclear-powered carrier with no escorts. The decision in this case is
between the alternative ways of spending the $400 million. Dr. Enthoven
argues that there may be disagreement on which is the better way to spend
the money "but there should be no disagreement that it is necessary and
2
correct to pose the problem in this fashion. "
The element for decision in this case is whether nuclear power on
the carrier is worth the sacrifice of four destroyer escorts. Therefore,
someone arguing for the nuclear -powered aircraft carrier should be willing
to argue that its effectiveness would be greater than the combined effective-
ness of the conventionally powered carrier and four escorts.
Dr. Enthoven implies that this kind of argument was not received







The argument as presented was that we should buy the 'best' carrier avail-
able, cost not considered, and then, it they are needed, buy the four
destroyer escorts also. Another facet of the Navy argument was that
arbitrary budget limitations should not restrict the progress of technology
in warship construction when the transition from oil fuel to nuclear fuel is
as common as the transition from sail to coal and from coal to oil in the
history of naval warships. Admiral Rickover, certainly the greatest advo-
cate of nuclear -powered ships, used extracts from the Secretary of the
Navy's 1963 testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to
press his point.
The basic question now before us is simple: Will we meet the
future challenges at sea with moiern, high-speed, nuclear -powered
surface forces, or will we continue the shortsighted budgetary expe-
dient of hamstringing our new ships --already too few in number --
with obsolete engines?
The dollar amounts for the new propulsion plants are large, but
only in terms of initial investment. They are not the huge, unman-
ageable sums they appear to be when they are compared with the
going price of weapons system investments which are built around
these plants. ^
Expanding on the previous discussion of the economic question of
how to use the $400 million, the point can again be raised that if the budget
limitation were not present, the man who wants a nuclear carrier plus four
destroyer escorts without budget limitation would have to reckon with the




U.S. Congress, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1967 , 89th Cong. , 2d
Sess.
, 1966. Testimony presented by VAdm. Hyman G. Rickover, p. 71.
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conventional carrier and eight destroyer escorts. The question of which way
to spend the money is still present. This is the kind of questions asked by
the Secretary of Defense, and the Navy is reluctant to answer him satisfac-
torily.
On the subject of nuclear carriers, the Navy engaged in extensive
study to show that the cost of nuclear power over twenty -five years was not
much more than the cost of conventional carriers over the same period of
time. The one ingredient lacking for the satisfaction of the Secretary of
Defense was some quantifiable estimate of the increase in effectiveness of
the nuclear -powered ship. The Navy statement, concluding their cost break-
down, was that nuclear power for surface ships offers a major increase in
2
effectiveness. "
As shown before, the Navy and the Secretary of Defense are faced
with the decision of how to allocate their resources. If nuclear power costs
33 per cent more for the same ship type, should the resources be divided
between three nuclear ships or four conventional ships? The only economic
way to make this allocation is to determine some quantity of increased effec-
tiveness of nuclear ships over conventional ships that would make it worth









The lack of effective quantification of effectiveness was only one of
the problems of analysis facing nuclear carriers. One other problem was
that the time horizon and method of "discounting in order to establish pres-
ent worth was not compatible within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the Navy. Certainly, length of the life cycle of a carrier, which extends
well into the 21st century, would complicate the analysis, and fractions of
difference in input could distort the presentation of facts to suit the presentor
if preconceived notions of the outcome were held. This is an example of the
danger in the treatment of alternatives with time horizons, as discussed
earlier.
The then Secretary of the Navy, Fred Korth, never did satisfy
Mr. McNamara on the justification of nuclear -powered carriers, and the
Secretary of Eefense ordered construction begun on conventionally powered
carriers. It was not until 1965, when the Navy's case became stronger with
some technological breakthroughs, that McNamara again considered nuclear
2
power.
Several more current examples of the presentation and acceptance
of economic "marginal utility - marginal cost" studies were gathered
through a series of personal interviews with Navy personnel in the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations and with military and civilian personnel in







the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Further insight was provided
through recent organizational documents. One of the first facts discovered
was that the Navy is realizing that their presentations to the Secretary of
Defense through formal and informal channels are not receiving the
acceptance hoped for, nor are they being utilized in their total form by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense systems analysis people in the prepara-
tion of Draft Presidential Memoranda.
Recognizing a need for a capacity for their own systems analysis
capability and a central repository for the talent required, the Navy estab-
lished, within the last eight months, a Systems Analysis Division in the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In addition, an internal memoran-
dum was issued to the force sponsors in the Navy, who have the responsi-
bility for deriving requirements for naval forces and for supporting such
requirements, in order to assist them in writing good solid force rationale
2
that will survive the critical analysis in the Secretary of Defense arena.
The purpose of that memorandum was to promote force level analy-
ses that relate missions, capabilities, threats, and strategic considerations
Because of the sensitive nature of some of the statements made by
those interviewed, anonymity was guaranteed and therefore their identity
and position in the organization will not be disclosed. Only the office will
be identified.
2
U.S. Department of the Navy, "A Guide for Force Sponsors, "
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum 997-66, July 21, 1966.
1
62
analytically to quantitative requirements. It has also been recognized that
the considerations in these analyses should be made available to the OSD ana-
lysts through the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan or at least as an addendum
to it. Previously only the conclusions of such examinations were made known,
without a definition of the underlying assumptions and alternatives. The
memorandum recognizes the realities of the Secretary of Defense role in
decisions regarding the Navy's force levels.
The facts of life of the present OSD force review cycle demand
inclusion of adequate analysis in the JSOP (including an examination
of alternatives, assumptions, and cost considerations), if the JSOP
is to be influential in the SECDEF determination of the necessary
force levels.
A hypothetical example of something the OSD systems analysts
received as guidance from the Navy last year is a statement of requirements
2
for additional destro/ers. The Navy's statement merely made known the
fact that Marine lives could be saved by additional off-shore fire power. To
provide this fire power, X number of destroyers were needed. The consid-
erations made by the Navy prior to this statement of requirements were not
made available to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Without these con-
siderations, the information was of little value to the analyst or to the
Secretary as decision maker.
The next attempt was much more detailed; in fact, it revealed a great
amount of study effort. This statement included quantification of the numbers
^id.
.
Tab B, p. 2.
Personal interview with a group of military and civilian personnel
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 8 and 9, 1967.
i die
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of destroyers required and the benefits to be gained in terms of Marine
lived saved, as in the following simplified hypothetical display:
Number of Destroyers Number of Marine Lives Saved
X - 3 A - 175
X - 2 A - 94
X - 1 A - 36
X A
X « 1 A + 3
X f 2 A + 4
X + 3 A -i 4
On the basis of this type of analysis, the decision maker could
make a judgment concerning the risk taken by reducing the number of
destroyers and the point where additional guns would provide no additional
benefit. This study is by itself still of little value to the OSD analyst in
making recommendations concerning the number of destroyers needed
because it does not show other considerations made by the Navy concerning
other means of providing fire power, such as air strike. The question 3till
unanswered in the mind of the Secretary of Defense is whether or not it
would be advantageous to increase the force by one carrier and some lesser
number of destroyers so as to add flexibility to the off-shore fire power and
save even more Marine lives. Other considerations not revealed in this
type of analysis are the increases in other types of naval warfare capability,
such as increased anti-submarine warfare capability as a result of
increased carrier or destroyer forces.
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During an interview in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
there was discussion concerning the presentation of something of new design
to replace something now in use. Their feeling was that no alternatives
could be created concerning this new weapon system. Follow-up discus-
sions in OSD indicated that many alternatives will certainly be considered
prior to a decision by the Secretary; for example:
- Buy none of the new things and continue use of the old;
- Buy some of the new things and use them with some of the old; or
- Use something different from either the new or the old.
Certainly some considerations were made by the Navy prior to its
decision to plump for the new thing. Unless these considerations are made
visible to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, however, the OASD(SA)
will create alternatives and analyze their various economic costs and
utilities.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently issued a directive
concerning the requirement for economic analysis of proposed defense
investments with a hypothetical example that parallels the one shown above.
In this case the project is a proposal to replace a number of forklift trucks
with a lesser number of superior type trucks. The benefits to this proposal
are savings in maintenance and reduction in the number of forklift drivers
required, and these benefits can be quantified. However, since forklift
Personal interview with a naval officer in the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations, March 8, 1967.
2
Personal interviews in OSD, op. cit.
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trucks are currently in operation and are doing a satisfactory job, it "must
be demonstrated in the analysis that a real saving (or increase in benefits)
may conservatively be expected over a number of years. M
Economic study is not only applied to cost but to alternatives as
applied to threat and capability as well. Systems analysis takes these ele-
ments into account as well as cost comparisons. One simple problem in
this category of systems analysis is that of choosing the next generation of
2
surface-to-air missiles.
The possible alternative missile systems may differ widely with
respect to accuracy, range, payload, and certain other characteristics,
such as alert status. It may seem obvious, for example, that if the accuracy
of the new missile can be improved over the old, the result will be more
enemy planes damaged. The systems analysts, however, state that it is not
necessarily true that the missile with the highest accuracy will necessarily
maximize the effectiveness of the over -all system. It may not even give
the individual missile within the system its highest kill potential.
If, for example, additional guidance and control equipment were
added to the missile to improve its accuracy, the incremental increase in
weight might reduce increments of range or speed of the missile. Also, the
greater complexity of more accurate guidance equipment might adversely
U.S. Department of the Navy, Navy Comptroller Review, P-1360,
XIV, No. 1 (March, 1967), 8.
2
Personal interviews in OSD, op. cit.
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affect its reliability. Consequently, in spite of the increased accuracy, the
over-all effectiveness might be reduced.
Most Navy problems, in fact, involve more complex analyses than
just cost; for example, operational and logistical factors such as mobility,
communications, supplies, maintenance, personnel, and training. Actions
or interactions of all of these elements must be considered in the systems
anal/sis approach.
The systems analysts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense are
currently enjoying extreme confidence in their approach to problems and this
is revealed in their dealings with senior military people. One officer
explains the situation in this way: Just because you have a chest full of rib-
bons and fought every war since 1900, it's no longer axiomatic that you have
2
all the military answers on new weapons. '
An example of this was revealed during an interview with a civilian
3
member of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has had numerous
discussions with a Vice Admiral, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, concerning the requirements for a major weapon system. The Admiral,
who has been concerned with this type of weapon system for his entire career,
is being pressed to explain why he needs X -t 20 units of this weapon system
while the member of OSD maintains that he needs only X units to wage war












to present an incremental analysis of every unit beyond X that he states as a
requirement. In his opinion, thi3 is unnecessary since the twenty additional
units above X is the number that he calculates as an attrition rate. His
stand is that in order to have X units to wage war, X + 20 units will be
required since some will be lost immediately or for various other reasons
will not be available for the war.
The OSD point of view is that attrition rate has no bearing on the
problem. Either the Navy will begin the war with X units or X + 20 units
and not with X units with 20 in the storage shed waiting to replace the ones
that are destroyed. With this position, how much could X do and how much
could X t 1, X -r 2, or X -f 20 produce in terms of national defense? This
situation between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of
Naval Operations is presently stalemated.
During a 1966 Congressional review of the Department of Defense
Cost Reduction Program, the conflict between the Navy and the Secretary
of Defense decision on procurement of F-4 aircraft for Navy and Marine
1Corps use became an issue of concern to the subcommittee. Of significant
concern was the validity of the planning that goes into the Five-Year Defense
Plan which projects the military requirements over a five-year period. The
December, 196', plan approved 150 F-4's for Fiscal Year 1965. In
November, 1962, the Secretary of Defense reduced this number to 132 by
U.S. Congress, Examination of the Department of Defense Cost
Reduction Program
, Report of the Subcommittee for Special Investigations





eliminating tactical and training squadrons and mixing F-4's and F-8's on
the carriers. The Secretary of the Navy made a strong appeal but the final
decision document did not reflect any of the Navy recommendations and held
forth on the original decision of 132 F-4's.
Although specifically requested to do so, the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense produced no evidence that between the approval of the force
structure in December, 1961, and the reduction of the procurement of F-4's
by the Secretary of Defense, less than a year later, any new factors or
considerations had developed which were not known at the time of the orig-
inal decision. This suggested to the subcommittee that either the basic
planning was faulty or the subsequent cut arbitrary.
Although this example took place during the very early stages of
the development of the Five-Year Defense Plan and the systems analysis
approach, some Navy people have similar criticism today. When reclama
are submitted on Initial Draft Presidential Memoranda, they feel that the
final decisions should reflect that the data submitted in these reclama have
been considered; however, often no analysis at all of the reclama is visible
to the Navy force sponsor. This, in effect, makes the decisions of the
Secretary of Defense seem arbitrary since the Navy has no knowledge of the
facts considered or the assumptions made in arriving at the final decision.
Personal interview with a naval officer in the Office of the Chief




Economic studies and analyses are not the only factors that the
Secretary of Tefense considers in his decision, but they certainly play a
major role in the force levels approved for ail of the services. The pri-
mary service input should be the Joint Strategic Objective Plan supplemented
by service Secretary input. The JSOP, in its present form, is not being
used by the OSD analysts in their preparation of Draft Presidential Memo-
randa because the analyses as shown above are incomplete. Many special
studies must be made and special information provided by the services in
addition to the detailed preparation for the service programs included in
the JSOP force requirements.
There is an immeasurable amount of work involved in this effort,
not only by OSD but by the services as well. Admiral Rickover gave some
hint of this fact in his testimony before a Congressional Subcommittee:
I have no people in my organization whose specific duty it is to
prepare studies and position papers. So we are placed in the position
of having to counter the Department's huge staff with our own efforts.
Our "day labor, " to quote Milton again, is so onerous that we must
work far into the night to prepare these studies --or else, give up.
A thorough examination of alternative ways of achieving an objective
is, however, the heart of both systems analysis and the military decision-
making process of today. In order to use systems analysis most effectively
Personal interviews in OSD, op. cit.
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as a tool for decision making, its benefits and limitations must be recog-
nized not only by the people providing the studies and information, but by the




Prior to Mr. McNamara's appointment as Secretary of Defense,
the Congress had passed through several major progressions of strengthen-
ing the authority of the office. No previous Secretary had been able to truly
manage the complexities of the Department of Defense. The Office of the
Secretary had, in fact, little involvement in the decision processes of the
Department until budget submissions were made. He was able to do little
more than accept the funds granted by the Congress and divide the total into
three parts and allocate these funds to each of the services, thus allowing
them to establish priorities of programs independent of each other and also
develop their own forces independently.
The President, when appointing Mr. McNamara, charged him "to
determine what forces were required and to procure and support them as
economically as possible. The new Secretary aggressively pursued his
role as that of a manager rather than a mere administrator or judge of the
decisions being made in the Department of Defense. In his opinion, the







with each of its elements considered in light of the total program, and this,
he believed, could be done only at the Office of the Secretary of Defense
level.
Mr. McNamara has been effective in carrying out his role as he
sees it. He personally makes the final decisions on most major military
projects and force levels considered in the Department. He has been able
to accomplish this through the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System which he and his comptroller, Charles Hitch, put into operation.
This system first oriented all military .forces around related missions
regardless of the military service. The Five -Year Defense Plan presents
these force structures and cost projections in terms of the principal mis-
sions of the Department of Defense. The process of continuously updating
the FYDP is essentially the PPB System. By requiring Secretary of
Defense approval to all changes to the Plan, Mr. McNamara has effectively
established the capacity for centralized decision making in his office. The
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System has therefore become the
design for decision making in the Department of Defense and the Five -Year
Defense Plan is the ever -current blueprint for the future.
In conjunction with the institution of the PPBS, a method of review
of program and force level proposals was incorporated. This method is
called systems analysis. Basically, systems analysis is an approach to or
a way of looking at complex problems of choice under uncertainty. Its pur-









systematically examining the objectives, costs, effectiveness, and risks of
alternatives and designing additional ones if those examined are inadequate.
Dr. Enthoven, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analy-
sis), describes his operation as applied economic analysis. In this light,
it is a study of how the Department of Defense allocates its resources, and
how it might be done more efficiently. He, in effect, analyzes the marginal
cost of DOD resources in relation to the marginal benefit expected to be
gained from the expenditure. In addition, he views the program elements
of the PPB System to determine if the most efficient mix of forces is being
considered. Although systems analysis is an art, not a science, its
approach to problems is systematic. The intent of systems analysis is to
apply an objective view to Defense plans and programs and to provide the
Secretary of Defense with a base from which to make intelligent decisions.
There are certain limitations to the approach of systems analysis.
For example, the analyses are necessarily incomplete in most cases
because the time allowed to make the analyses is limited, as is the cost;
many considerations cannot be treated because they are intangible in nature,
like emotional, political, and morality matters; many measures of
effectiveness are considered approximations at best; and there is no way to
predict the future. Further, judgment and intuition are important ingredi-
ents in the designing of models; in deciding on the alternatives to be consid-
ered; in deciding on what is relevant and what is not; and in the interpreta-
tion of the results. Each of these ingredients necessarily affects the out-
come of the analysis.
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The military services have been encouraged to retreat from
parochialism and to submit their proposals to the Secretary of Defense in
the format used by the systems analyst. Up to this time, the services have
not been able to accomplish this to the complete satisfaction of Mr. McNamara
or Dr. Enthoven. The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) has made
some progress in this direction, but the improvements have been relatively
minor. The JSOP is still not being used by the OSD analysts in their prepara-
tion of Draft Presidential Memoranda.
The Navy, in particular, has been frustrated in its attempts to con-
vince the Office of the Secretary of Defense of its requirements. This is due
primarily to the fact that their presentations have been less than complete.
There are three reasons tor this incompleteness: (1) a reluctance on the
part oi program and force sponsors to provide alternatives to their deter-
mined requirements, fearing that their positions would be diluted; (2) insuf-
ficient knowledge of other programs being sponsored within the Navy and
the other services; but most importantly, (3) a lack of realization of the
nature of the analysis to which their recommendation would be subjected at
the OSD level. What was not understood (and still is not in some elements
of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations) is that the OSD analysts create
their own alternatives to single -position presentations. This is dilution of
the worst kind because, for the most part, the analysts are not in as good a
position as the program or force sponsor to present alternatives and make
assumptions concerning their projects.
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Realizing this fact, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations is in
the process of revising its force level requirements presentations to include
alternative ways to achieve the objectives. They are attempting to contrast
the capabilities of present programs with the additional capabilities provided
by the recommended force objectives, and to quantify the difference in capa-
bility in terms more meaningful than 'more' or less. ' Alternative mixes
of forces are sometimes considered in the Navy, but because of its organi-
zational structure this is not always true, as shown in the off-shore support
mission study where destroyer forces were considered without examination
of air attack capability.
The Navy has felt other frustrations from decisions made by the
Secretary of Defense because the OSD analysts' studies are not always pro-
vided to the Navy to show either the alternatives considered or the assump-
tions made during the study.
One of the major purposes oi the systems analysis approach is to
provide the Secretary of Defense with a base for decisions which is free of
parochial or emotional influence. And although the proponents of systems
analysis recognize and admit to the limitations inherent in the approach,
observations made during interviews indicated that some of the analysts are
less aware of these limitations in the actual practice of their art. The
danger here is that by extolling, without qualification, the virtues of ''quanti






The systems analysis approach, although not fully recognized or
utilized within the services, is serving an important function in the Depart-
ment of Defense. The long-range plans, the intermediate programs, and
the immediate budget requirements are receiving critical analysis which is
necessary to provide decision -making capability to the Secretary of Defense.
Recognition of the increased importance of the systems analysis approach
is manifest in its recent elevation to an Assistant Secretary of Defense level.
The office has also been expanded from 45 people in 1963 to its present staff
of over 140.
The entire planning -programming -budgeting system with its accom-
panying analysis effort is here to stay. The President has directed all
Federal agencies to implement the system. PPBS and systems analysis
techniques are not really new. One of the greatest problems is to eliminate
the mystery surrounding the concept. As Mr. Mogin pointed out in his
speech before the Navy Financial Management class:
There is nothing novel about the system we have established,
except perhaps as regards the manner in which we have assembled
the various components of our planning, programming, budgeting
system and our analysis process. As Dr. Enthoven likes to state,
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